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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw- VALIDITY OF SPECIAL LEGISLATION -
ACTS AUTHORIZING REOPENING OF C.iumS UNDER WomKmN's Com-
PENSATION LAN.-Several coal companies filed prohibition proceed-
ings against the compensation commissioner and certain claimants
under the Workmen's Compensation Act, contending that special
legislative acts, each authorizing the reopening of an individual
claim, were unconstitutional. Each of the cases had been closed
under the general law. Held, that these special acts violated the
constitutional provision that" . . . in no case shall a special act be
passed where a general law would be proper and can be made ap-
plicable to the case .. ". Truax-Traer Coal Co. v. Compensation
Comm'r.
2
All but four states have some sort of constitutional restrictions
on local and special legislation.3 One type of provision declares
that a special act is prohibited in any field which is already regu.
lated by a law general in nature and uniform in operation.' '4 Under
such provisions the validity of special legislation, where there is
a general law in existence, is naturally for judicial determination,
since it depends wholly upon the meaning of the constitutional pro-
vision, the scope and effect of the general law, and the sense and
proposed effect of the special .act.' The first and basic problem
which must be solved depends upon the subject matter to which the
special legislation is referable. It may appear that the act in ques-
tion embraces conditions which are foreign to the general law in
existence, or that the latter has not been so framed that it will
meet the present contingency. The constitutionality of the special
law is then assured.
Article six, section thirty-nine of the West Virginia Constitu-
W. VA. CoNsT. art. VI, § 39.
217 S. E. (2d) 330 (W. Va. 1941).
3 Conn., Mass., N. H., and Vt. The Constitution of the United States con-
tains no restrictions. CRAWFORD, STATUTORY CONSTaRUCION (1940) § 80.
4 CAFwORD, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 80. Such constitutional provisions
usually provide that all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation
everywhere within the state. They may also forbid the enactment of special
laws on certain subjects. Some provide that local laws shall not be passed by
indirection or by the partial repeal of a general law. It is apparent that the
constitutional provisions are lacking in uniformity.
State v. Bowles, 217 Ala. 458, 116 So. 662 (1928) ; Pasadena v. Stimson, 91
Cal. 238, 27 Pac. 604 (1891) ; Crabbe v. State, 88 Ga. 584, 15 S. E. 455 (1891) ;
Henderson v. ]Koenig, 168 Mo. 356, 68 S. W. 72 (1902); Philadelphia Co. v.
Commonwealth, 270 Pa. St. 353, 113 AtI. 661 (1921); 1 Lzwis' SUTHERLAND,
STATUORY CosmuioN (2d ed. 1904) § 191.
6 Tinsley v. State, 109 Ga. 822, 35 S. E. 303 (1900) ; State v. Anslinger, 171
Mo. 600, 71 S. W. 1041 (1903); Walsh v. Dousman, 28 Wis. 541 (1871).
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tion is another type of restriction.7 It limits more sharply the
legislative use of individual or local laws. They axe forbidden not
only where there is an applicable general law, but in every case
where a law general in nature and operative effect would be proper
and could be made applicable to the subject. The courts have dif-
fered as to which branch of government, the legislature or the
judiciary, should have the final determination in this regard. It
is said that the judgment of the legislature is conclusive, and that
the courts cannot invade the legislative domain to discuss the ap-
plicability of a general law." The court in the Truax case criticizes
this view, stating that the constitutional provision under these hold-
ings "becomes merely monitory and of no practical effect". 9 In
recognition of the anomalous situation thus created, there is an
increasing tendency to declare this question to be, in the first in-
stance, for legislative determination, but ultimately for the courts."0
A number of the cases hasten to add that every presumption in
favor of the constitutionality of the act will be indulged, making no
investigation of the legislative exercise of discretion unless it is
clearly and palpably unreasonable." The West Virginia court, in
Woodall v. Darst,2 mentions this principle. It must be noted, how-
ever, that the special appropriation in that case was upheld, the
court refusing to question the legislative determination of fact on
which the act was based. A later decision, Brozka v. Brooke County.
Court,"3 quoting with approval the language of the WoodalZ case,
stated that the circumstances under consideration fulfilled the re-
quirements which would warrant action by the court. The princi-
ple was plainly unnecessary as a basis for the decision, because
7 The provision enumerates cases in which local or special laws shall not be
passed by the Legislature, adding the following: "The Legislature shall pro-
vide, by general laws, for the foregoing and all other cases for which provision
can be so made; and in no case shall a special act be passed, where a general law
would be proper, and can be made applicable to the case, nor in any other case
in which the courts have jurisdiction, and are competent to give the relief asked
f or. I
8 Guthrie National Bank v. Guthrie, 173 U. S. 528, 19 S. Ct. 513, 43 L. Ed.
796 (1899); Richman v. Bd. of Supervisors Muscatine County, 77 Iowa 513, 42
N. W. (1889); 1 LmwIs' SUTEMRLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIO (2d ed. 1904)
§ 189.
9 17 S. E. (2d) 330, 334 (W. Va. 1941).
10 Quilici v. Strosnider, 34 Nev. 9, 115 Pac. 117 (1911) ; School Dist. No. 85,
Kay County v. School Dist. No. 71, Kay County, 135 Olda. 270, 276 Pac. 186
(1928); Thomas v. Spartanburg Ry. Gas & Electric Co., 100 S. C. 478, 85 S.
E. 50 (1915).
"Wheeler v. Herbert, 152 Cal. 224, 92 Pac. 353 (1907); Philadelphia Co.
v. Commonwealth, 270 Pa. 353, 113 Atl. 661 (1921); State ex rel. Rickey v.
Sims, 7 S. E. (2d) 54 (W. Va. 1940).
12 71 W. Va. 350, 77 S. B. 264 (1912).
'3111 W. Va. 191, 160 S. E. 914 (1931).
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there was in existence a general statute which the court interpreted
as adequately covering the subject matter sought to be regulated by
the special enactment. Although our court has professed adherence
to the principle of ultimate judicial determination, it is interesting
to note that in every case where a special act has been struck down,
it has interfered with a general law,14 as in the Truax case. While
setting forth the reservation of judicial power, the court has either
construed the enactment as general in nature, 15 or has held the
classification made by the legislature to be reasonably justified.' 0
The substance and practical operation rather than the form
or phraseology of the statute will determine whether it is special
or general. Some courts have considered extrinsic evidence of cir-
cumstances and motives for the passage of the law ;17 others have
refused to look beyond the act itself, and have not entertained
declarations that the basic considerations involved here were local in
nature.' 8 It may be argued that the principle of judicial ultimacy
has constituted a second legislature, in effect, too far removed from
the particular wants which the legislation is to serve. On the other
side of the issue, it is pertinent to recall the reason for which the
constitutional restrictions here under review were adopted - the
prevention of the abusive use of such laws for personal advantage.
In most instances the courts seem to have used their reservation
of power benevolently, "to secure as many interests as may be with
as little sacrifice of other interests as may be. "19
G. W. E.
CORPORATIONS -De.acto CORPORATIONS -RIGHT TO SUE IN
OwN NAEE AFTER DISSOLUTION. - P corporation sues to remove
a cloud on title to certain lands and to enjoin D from interfering
with the possession thereof. D filed a plea in abatement to the effect
that P's charter had been forfeited by a court decree for nonpay-
ment of taxes. P contended that its corporate existence was not
14 It must be noted that special laws have also been held unconstitutional
where they purported to regulate one of the enumerated subjects in which the
constitution expressly prohibits special legislation. W. VA. CONST. art. VI, §
39. A discussion of the problems involved in this connection is not within the
scope of this comment.
15 State ex rel. Rickey v. Sims, 7 S. E. (2d) 54 (W. Va. 1940).
16 O'Brien v. Board of Com'rs, 116 W. Va. 404, 180 S. E. 537 (1935).
17 Handy v. Johnson, 51 F. (2d) 809 (E. D. Tex., 1931) ; Graeff v. Schlott-
man, 287 Pa. 342, 135 Atl. 308 (1926).
is Walden v. Montgomery, 214 Ala. 409, 108 So. 231 (1926).
'9 Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Juristio Thought (1914) 27
HARv. L. REv. 605.
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